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Abstract
We study a model of war in which the outcome is uncertain not because of luck on the
battleﬁeld (as in standard models), but because the involved countries lack information
about their opponent. In our model their production and military technologies are com-
mon knowledge, but their resources are private information. Each country decides how to
allocate its resources to production and warfare. The country with the stronger military
wins and receives aggregate production. In equilibrium the country with a comparative
advantage in warfare allocates all resources to warfare for low resource levels and follows a
non-decreasing concave strategy thereafter. The opponent allocates a constant fraction of
its resources to warfare for low resource levels and follows an increasing non-linear strat-
egy thereafter. From an ex ante perspective the country with a comparative advantage
in warfare is likely to win the war unless its military technology is much weaker than the
opponent’s.
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11 Introduction
The outcome of many conﬂicts and wars is uncertain from the perspective of the involved
parties or countries, as well as from the outsiders’ perspective. Standard models of conﬂicts
and wars account for this uncertainty by assuming that luck plays a crucial role on the
battleﬁeld. In this paper we study an alternative model in which countries are uncertain
about the outcome not because of luck on the battleﬁeld, but because of a lack of information
about their opponent and, consequently, its endogenous military power.
In this model there are two countries (or regions) characterized by their production and
military technologies, which are common knowledge, and their resources. Each country only
knows the level of its own resources, and can choose how to allocate them to production and
warfare. The resource allocation and the technologies determine domestic production and
military power. The country with the greater miliary power wins and can consume all goods
that have been produced in the two countries, while the loosing country gets nothing. Our
model therefore resembles an all-pay auction in which the winner’s prize is endogenous and
decreasing in both bids.
The assumption of incomplete information about the opponent’s resources can have vari-
ous interpretations. First, the two countries can be imperfectly informed about each other’s
labor-force or stock of human and physical capital. We imagine that throughout history this
was often the case when two tribes, possibly from remote forests or mountainous areas, were
ﬁghting against each other. But even nowadays, most countries lack precise estimates of their
opponent’s resources and, therefore, its productive and military potential.1 Second, even
countries that know the size of their opponent’s labor-force during peacetime might not know
how many people who are normally out of the labor-force are willing and able to help out
on the home front (i.e. in production) or the battleﬁeld during wartime.2 Finally, a broader
understanding of resources does not only include the available labor-force and the stocks of
1One reason is that oﬃcial ﬁgures on, e.g., labor supply and production are often biased, and that the size of
these biases are typically unknown. Shleifer and Treisman (2005) argue that oﬃcial ﬁgures tend to overestimate
true resources and production in communist countries in which managers routinely inﬂate production ﬁgures.
In contrast, oﬃcial ﬁgures may underestimate true resources and production in capitalist countries in which
individuals and businesses may want to evade taxation.
2As an example, many were surprised by the dramatic increase in women’s labor force participation in the
United States during World War II.
2human and physical capital, but also how dedicated and motivated people are to use their
labor and their human capital for the best of their country during wartime. Even a coun-
try that can accurately guess the size of its opponent’s labor-force and capital stocks during
wartime may lack accurate information about the dedication and the morale of the opponent
country’s people on the home front and the battleﬁeld.3
We characterize monotone continuous equilibrium strategies for all possible values of the
parameters representing the countries’ production and military technologies. Interestingly,
these strategies depend on absolute as well as comparative advantages in warfare.4 They are
straightforward if the country with a comparative advantage in warfare has a large absolute
disadvantage in warfare. For any resource level this country then allocates all resources to
warfare, while its opponent only allocates some fraction of its resources to warfare. Because
of its better military technology, the opponent nevertheless has the stronger military at any
resource level. From an ex ante perspective, the opponent is therefore likely to win the war.
Equilibrium strategies are more involved if the country with a comparative advantage in
warfare has also an absolute advantage or only a modest absolute disadvantage in warfare.
This country then allocates all resources to warfare up to some threshold and follows a non-
decreasing and concave strategy for higher resource levels. Its opponent allocates a constant
fraction of its resources to warfare up to some threshold and follows an increasing non-linear
strategy for higher resource level. Hence, at low resource levels it is again the country with
a comparative advantage in warfare that allocates more resources to warfare. However, at
high resource levels absolute advantages matter: the country with an absolute advantage in
warfare allocates less resources to warfare in order to avoid diverting many more resources
away from production when already winning the war with high probability. The country with
a comparative advantage in warfare nevertheless has the stronger military at any resource
level. From an ex ante perspective this country is therefore likely to win the war.
The theoretical literature on conﬂicts and wars contains two main strands. The ﬁrst looks
3As an example, many were surprised by the (initial) reluctance of Iraqis to ﬁght when the United States
and its allies invaded Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. Many were also surprised by the ﬁerce
resistance of some Iraqi factions in later years.
4The country with the better miliary technology is said to have an absolute advantage in warfare, and the
country with the higher ratio of miliary to production technology a comparative advantage in warfare.
3at reasons why conﬂicts emerge, and the second studies how conﬂicts are fought.5 Our model
contributes to the second strand. It is closely related to the standard models of conﬂicts
and wars that go back to Haavelmo (1954) and have been popularized by Garﬁnkel (1990),
Grossman (1991), Hirshleifer (1991, 2001), and Skaperdas (1992). Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas
(2007) present a synthesis of these models, which typically have four key features: First, there
is a war taking place for exogenous reasons. Second, each country can choose how to allocate
its resources to production and warfare. Third, the mapping from the resources that the
diﬀerent countries allocate to warfare to the outcome of the war is probabilistic. Fourth, the
winning country can consume all production. While keeping the ﬁrst two and the last of these
features, we assume that the country with the stronger military wins for sure. Moreover, we
add the assumption that countries are imperfectly informed about their opponent’s resources.
Our model thus oﬀers a complementary view according to which countries are uncertain
about the outcome of the war not because of luck on the battleﬁeld, but because of a lack of
information about their opponent. This view allows us to study how aggressively countries
behave at diﬀerent resource levels, i.e., depending on the level of their resources relative to
the level that their opponent expected.
Despite these diﬀerences in the setup, our results share some properties with the standard
models of conﬂict and war: Countries with few resources tend to allocate all resources to war-
fare, and countries with a comparative advantage in warfare tend to allocate more resources
to warfare than their opponent. However, there are some interesting diﬀerences: First, in the
standard models each player’s equilibrium strategy is simply a choice of a particular resource
allocation that depends on his and the opponent’s known resource level, while in our model
it is a function of his own resource level.6 Hence we can present the results for diﬀerent re-
source levels in a uniﬁed way, as the same player may allocate all resources to warfare at low
resource levels, but not at higher levels. Second, when the resource constraint is not binding,
the share of resources allocated to warfare is linear in the resource level in standard models
(e.g., Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas, 2007), but non-linear in ours. This non-linearity in our model
5Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2007) and Blattman and Miguel (2010) review the literature. See also Jackson
and Morelli (forthcoming) for a survey of the ﬁrst strand of this literature.
6This follows because the strategy space is a subset of ℜ+ in the standard models, but a subset of functions
from ℜ+ to ℜ+ in our model.
4follows from the players’ comparative advantages. Lastly, and from an economic point most
interestingly, we ﬁnd that equilibrium strategies depend not only on comparative but also on
absolute advantages in warfare.
Most other models of conﬂicts in which countries have some private information contribute
to the ﬁrst strand of the theoretical literature on conﬂicts and wars by studying the emer-
gence of conﬂicts. Thereby they typically take military power as given (e.g., Fearon, 1995).
Building on these models, Meirowitz and Satori (2008) present a model with a similar ﬂavor
as ours in that war can occur between two countries that have invested in military power
but cannot observe each other’s investment. In their model private information follows from
countries playing mixed strategies when deciding how much to invest in military power.7 The
complexity and generality of their model comes however at the cost that equilibrium strategies
cannot be derived.
As we model war as an asymmetric auction with incomplete information, our paper also
relates to the literature on auction theory. Our model thereby shares some features with
both all-pay and winner-pay auctions. Like in all-pay auctions, all bids need to be paid, i.e.,
no resources allocated to warfare can be used to produce consumption goods.8 And like in
winner-pay auctions, the loser ends up with a payoﬀ of zero independently of his bid. The
main diﬀerence to both all-pay and winner-pay auctions is that in our model the winner’s
payoﬀ decreases in his own bid as well as the loser’s bid.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 presents some preliminary results. Section 4 derives and discusses the equilibrium.
Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains all proofs.
7Jackson and Morelli (2009) study a model similar to Meirowitz and Satori (2008), but assume that invest-
ments in miliary power are observable.
8The literature on all-pay auctions with incomplete information goes back to Amann and Leininger (1996)
and Krishna and Morgan (1997). Feess et al. (2008) study an all-pay auction with incomplete information in
which one player may have a handicap in the same way as one country may have a lower military technology
in our model.
52 The Model
There are two countries that are at war for some exogenous reason. Each country i = 1,2
acts as a single player, and the two countries must simultaneously decide how to allocate
their resources ri to production and warfare. We assume that r1 and r2 are independently
drawn from a uniform distribution on the unit interval, and that their realizations are private
information while their distribution is common knowledge.9
The military power of country i is λibi, where λi > 0 is its military technology, and bi
the resources it allocates to warfare. The production of consumption goods of country i is
βi(ri−bi), where βi > 0 is its production technology, and (ri−bi) the resources it allocates to
production. The resource constraint requires bi ∈ [0,ri]. The technology parameters βi and
λi are common knowledge, but may diﬀer across countries.
The outcome of the war is deterministic in that the country with the higher military power
λibi wins for sure. The winning country can consume all goods that have been produced in




    
    
0 for λibi < λjbj
βi(ri − bi) for λibi = λjbj
β1(r1 − b1) + β2(r2 − b2) for λibi > λjbj.
In this game, the strategy space is such that country i’s strategies are of the form bi =
fi(ri): [0,1] → [0,ri]. We look for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone continuous
strategies that are diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.
We deﬁne λ ≡ λ1
λ2 and β ≡
β1





λ2. That is, we call the country with a comparative advantage in warfare
country 1, and the country with a comparative advantage in the production of consumption
9We think of resources as a composite measure that include a country’s labor-force and its stock of human
and physical capital as well as the motivation and dedication of the people to work and ﬁght hard during
wartime. As argued in the introduction, the private information of resource levels can represent a situation in
which each country is uncertain about the labor-force and the stocks of human and physical capital available
to its opponent; or one in which each country is uncertain about how motivated and dedicated the opponent’s
people are to use their labor-force and their capital stocks during wartime.
6goods country 2. Subsequently we refer to countries as players, thereby calling player 1 “she”
and player 2 “he”. Moreover, we call their choices of bi their bids or real bids, while referring
to λibi as their eﬀective bids. Eﬀective bids play a key role in this game because the player
with the higher eﬀective bid wins the war.
3 Preliminary Results
In this section we ﬁrst present an important lemma. We then study a simpliﬁed version of
the game introduced in the previous section to understand some of the main forces at work.
Lemma 1 In any monotone equilibrium it holds that f1(0) = f2(0) = 0, that f1(.) and f2(.)
are non-decreasing, and that λf1(1) = f2(1).
Lemma 1 already puts some structure on the players’ bidding strategies. It directly follows
from the resource constraint that players with zero resources cannot allocate any resources
to warfare. As a consequence, monotone strategies must be non-decreasing. Moreover, no
player ever bids more than necessary to win with probability one because the winner’s payoﬀ
decreases in the resources he or she has allocated to warfare. Eﬀective bids must thus coincide
at the top, i.e. if r1 = r2 = 1.
We next solve our game assuming that the three properties speciﬁed in Lemma 1 hold,
but abstracting from the resource constraint for ri > 0 and i = 1,2. This simpliﬁed version of
the game has a closed-form solution that is easy to interpret and helpful to understand how
the players’ incentives shape their behavior. To avoid confusion, we call the equilibrium of
this simpliﬁed version of our game a quasi-equilibrium.
We start by focusing on the bidding strategy chosen by player 1 assuming that player 2
chooses the non-decreasing strategy f2(r2). Player 1 wins if and only if she bids y >
f2(r2)
λ ,
i.e., if and only if r2 < f−1
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Figure 1: Player 1’s trade-oﬀ
She faces a trade-oﬀ as a marginal increase in y increases the probability of winning, but
reduces the prize, i.e. aggregate production of consumption goods. It follows from the ﬁrst-
order condition that the optimal bid y = f1(r1) must satisfy
−βf−1
2 (λy) + [β(f−1
1 (y) − y) + f−1







1 (y) − y) + β2(f−1
2 (λy) − λy)]df−1
2 (λy) = β1dyf−1
2 (λy). (3)
Condition (3) and Figure 1 illustrate the trade-oﬀ that player 1 faces. Consider a type of
player 1 that bids y and thinks about bidding y + dy (such that her eﬀective bid would
increase from λy to λ(y + dy)). The beneﬁt from increasing the bid by dy occurs if this
increase turns her into a winner. This event occurs with probability df−1
2 (λy) and generates
an expected marginal beneﬁt as represented on the left-hand side of (3). The marginal cost
of increasing the bid is borne if player 2 is already a winner when bidding y. This event
occurs with probability f−1
2 (λy). The opportunity cost of increasing the bid is the forgone
production β1dy. Hence the right-hand side of (3) represents the expected marginal cost of
increasing the bid.
8Similarly, if player 1 chooses the non-decreasing strategy f1(r1), then player 2’s optimal
bid y = f2(r2) must satisfy
−f−1
1 (y) + [β(f−1
1 (y) − y) + f−1





It follows from the system of the two diﬀerential equations (2) and (4):
Lemma 2 Disregarding any constraints, the players’ strategies are mutual best responses if


































where K0, K1 and K2 are constants.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that the quasi-equilibrium strategies must be of form (5) and (6),
respectively, and satisfy the boundary conditions f1(0) = f2(0) = 0 and λf1(1) = f2(1). It
follows:





















These quasi-equilibrium strategies are increasing. Moreover, they are linear and reduce to
f1(r1) =
1+β
3β r1 and f2(r2) =
β(1+β)
3β r2 if β = λ. Hence, if none of the players has a comparative
advantage in warfare, the one with lower βi and λi bids so much more than his or her opponent
that their eﬀective bids exactly coincide for any resource level.
The more interesting situation arises if β < λ. Then player 1’s quasi-equilibrium strategy
is strictly concave, and player 2’s quasi-equilibrium strategy strictly convex. Since λf1(0) =
f2(0) and λf1(1) = f2(1), it follows that λf1(r) > f2(r) for all r ∈ (0,1). That is, in the
absence of resource constraints, player 1 who has a comparative advantage in warfare chooses
9the higher eﬀective bid, i.e. the stronger military, at any resource level r ∈ (0,1). Player 1
thus wins the war when having weakly more resources than player 2, and even when having
slightly less resources. From an ex ante perspective, i.e. in expectation before nature draws
r1 and r2, player 1 is therefore more likely to win the war than her opponent.
Turning from eﬀective to real bids, it directly follows from λf1(r) > f2(r) for all r ∈ (0,1)
that f1(r) > f2(r) for all r ∈ (0,1) if λ ≤ 1. Hence player 1 chooses a higher real bid and
allocates more resources to warfare than her opponent for any resource level when she has a
comparative advantage, but an absolute disadvantage in warfare. This is necessary for her
to build the stronger military. However, if λ > 1, there exists a unique threshold ˆ r ∈ (0,1)
such that f1(r) > f2(r) for r ∈ (0, ˆ r) and f1(r) < f2(r) for r ∈ (ˆ r,1).10 That is, when player
1 has a comparative and an absolute advantage in warfare, she allocates more resources to
warfare than her opponent for relatively low resource levels, but less resources for relatively
high resource levels. The former is driven by her incentive to specialize in warfare, and the
latter by her incentive not to allocate many more resources to warfare when already winning
the war with high probability.
The quasi-equilibrium strategies (7) and (8) characterize equilibrium behavior if and only
if they satisfy the resource constraint fi(ri) ≤ ri for ri > 0 and i = 1,2. This is the case if








, the quasi-equilibrium strategy of the player
with lower βi and λi violates the resource constraint for all resource levels. And if β < λ,
player 1’s quasi-equilibrium strategy and any other strategy of form (5) violate the resource
constraint for r1 suﬃciently close to zero.11
4 Equilibrium
In this section we ﬁrst characterize the players’ equilibrium strategies for all possible values
of β and λ. We then compare their real and eﬀective bids. The general pattern will be similar
10Existence and uniqueness of this threshold can be established using the following observations. First, the
quasi-equilibrium strategy f1(r1) is continuously increasing and concave, while f2(r2) is continuously increasing
and convex. Second, f1(0) = f2(0) and limr→0+ f
′
1(r) > limr→0+ f
′
2(r) since β < λ. Third, f1(1) < f2(1) since
λf1(1) = f2(1) and λ > 1.
11Note that limr1→0+ f
′
1(r1) = ∞ if f1(r1) is characterized by (5) and β < λ. Since f1(0) = 0, it follows that










Figure 2: Regions in the parameter space
as in the quasi-equilibrium. The behavioral diﬀerences that will occur are due to the resource
constraints that the players are facing, and not due to changes in their incentives. The insights
that we have gained in the previous section will therefore be helpful to understand equilibrium
behavior.
We know from the previous section that strategies satisfying (5) and (6) are mutual best
responses, and that they are non-linear unless β = λ. Also we know that any strategy of type
(5) violates player 1’s resource constraint for r1 suﬃciently close to zero if β < λ. We thus
conjecture that player 1’s equilibrium strategy includes bidding all resources r1 up to some
threshold cl > 0, and possibly to follow a non-linear strategy of type (5) for r1 > cl. The
following result will therefore be useful:
Lemma 3 Suppose player 1 follows a non-decreasing strategy with f1(r1) = r1 for r1 ≤ cl.
Then player 2’s best response that is lower than λcl is f2(r2) = r2
2 .
Suppose player 2 follows a non-decreasing strategy with f2(r2) = r2
2 for r2 ≤ 2λcl. Then
player 1’s best response is f1(r1) = r1 for r1 ≤ cl.
We next derive the equilibrium strategies separately for diﬀerent regions of the parameter
space. These regions are shown in Figure 2. We focus on regions A, B and C, which are
consistent with our assumption β ≤ λ. We do not explicitly derive equilibrium strategies
for regions A’, B’ and C’ in which β > λ. However it is straightforward to show that these
equilibrium strategies are symmetrical to those in regions A, B and C, respectively.
11Figure 3: Eﬀective equilibrium bids in region A (with β = 0.3 and λ = 0.4)
Region A is deﬁned by β ≤ λ ≤ 1
2. Hence player 1 has a comparative advantage but a
large absolute disadvantage in warfare. She has therefore little incentive to allocate resources
to production because she can produce relatively little anyway, and because she needs to bid
much more aggressively than her opponent if she ever wants to win the war. We can thus
explain equilibrium behavior using Lemmas 1 and 3 only.
Proposition 1 Assume λ ≤ 1
2. Then player 1’s equilibrium strategy is f1(r1) = r1, and





Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium strategies described in Proposition 1. Note that the
proposition states our results in real bids, while the ﬁgure shows eﬀective bids. Player 1 bids
all resources for any resource level r1. Player 2’s best response is to bid half his resources,
but never more than necessary to win with probability one. Figure 3 further shows that
λf1(r) ≤ f2(r) for all r ∈ [0,1] despite f1(r) ≥ 2f2(r) for all r ∈ [0,1]. We will come back
to comparisons of the players’ real and eﬀective bids after characterizing the equilibrium
strategies for λ > 1
2.
The strategies described in Proposition 1 cannot explain equilibrium behavior when λ > 1
2,
as player 1 would have an incentive to deviate and to allocate some resources to production for
r1 > 1
2λ. Nevertheless she still has an incentive to bid all resources for low r1. To derive the
equilibrium strategies we therefore use Lemmas 1 and 3 as well as Lemma 2. In particular, we
12conjecture that player 1’s equilibrium strategy is f1(r1) = r1 for r1 ∈ [0,cl], where cl ∈ (0,1),
and of type (5) for r1 ∈ (cl,1], and that player 2’s equilibrium strategy is f2(r2) = r2
2 for
r2 ∈ [0,2λcl] and of type (6) for r2 ∈ (2λcl,1]. Given these conjectured equilibrium strategies,
the system of equations (5) and (6) must satisfy the boundary condition
λf1(cl) = f2(2λcl) = λcl. (9)
It follows:































Suppose player 2 follows a non-decreasing strategy with f2(r2) given by (11) for r2 ≥ 2λcl.
Then player 1’s best response f1(r1) that is higher than cl is given by (10). It holds that
f′
1(.) > 0, f′
1(cl) = 1, f′′
1(.) < 0 and f′
2(.) > 0.
It is straightforward to see that the conjectured equilibrium strategies do not violate the
players’ resource constraints for r1 ≤ cl and r2 ≤ 2λcl. Also player 1’s conjectured equilibrium
strategy does not violate her resource constraint for any r1 > cl, as her strategy described
by (10) satisﬁes f′
1(cl) = 1 and is concave for r1 > cl. However it is a priori unclear whether
or not player 2’s conjectured equilibrium strategy violates the resource constraint for some
r2 > 2λcl. We know from Lemma 1 that the strategies described by (10) and (11) must satisfy
the boundary condition λf1(1) = f2(1) if f2(r2) does not violate the resource constraint for any
r2 > 2λcl. This boundary condition and (10) and (11) imply cl = (2λ)
λ
β−λ. An equilibrium
of the type conjectured therefore exists if and only if the strategy described by (11) satisﬁes
f2(r2) ≤ r2 for all r2 > 2λcl when cl = (2λ)
λ
β−λ. The following proposition establishes that
13Figure 4: Eﬀective equilibrium bids in region B (with β = 1 and λ = 2)
this is the case if and only if
















< λ ≤ Λ(β,λ). This proposition thus applies to region B,
which is characterized by β ≤ λ and 1
2 < λ ≤ Λ(β,λ)
Proposition 2 Assume 1
2 < λ ≤ Λ(β,λ), which implies Λ(β,λ) > 2. Then player 1’s
equilibrium strategy is f1(r1) = r1 for r1 ∈ [0,cl] and as described by (10) for r1 ∈ (cl,1],
with cl = (2λ)
λ
β−λ < 1. Player 2’s equilibrium strategy is f2(r2) = r2
2 for r2 ∈ [0,2λcl] and as
described by (11) for r2 ∈ (2λcl,1], with 2λcl < 1.
Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium strategies described in Proposition 2. It shows that player
1’s resource constraint is binding for r1 ≤ cl, while player 2 responds by bidding half his
resources for r2 ≤ 2λcl. For higher resource levels, both players’ strategies are non-linear and
their eﬀective bids coincide at the top.
It remains to explain equilibrium behavior in region C, which is characterized by β ≤ λ
and λ > Λ(β,λ). We know from the deﬁnition of Λ(β,λ) that player 2’s resource constraint
must be binding at the top in this region, which of course aﬀects player 1’s strategy for high
resource levels. We conjecture that in this case the strategy proﬁle satisﬁes the boundary
14Figure 5: Eﬀective equilibrium bids in region C (with β = 1 and λ = 3)
condition
λf1(ch) = f2(1) = 1, (13)
where ch < 1. It then follows from Lemma 1 that player 1 bids f1(r1) = 1
λ for all r1 ≥ ch.
Therefore:
Proposition 3 Assume λ > Λ(β,λ). Then player 1’s equilibrium strategy is f1(r1) = r1
for r1 ∈ [0,cl], as described by (10) for r1 ∈ (cl,ch] and f1(r1) = 1
λ for r1 ∈ (ch,1], with cl














satisfying cl < ch < 1. Player 2’s equilibrium strategy is f2(r2) = r2
2 for r2 ∈ [0,2λcl] and as
described by (11) for r2 ∈ (2λcl,1], with 2λcl < 1.
Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium strategies described in Proposition 3. Unlike in Figure
4, player 2’s resource constraint is now binding at the top, and player 1 responds by never
submitting any bid higher than necessary to win the war with probability one.
Having derived the players’ equilibrium strategies for all possible values of β and λ, we
next compare their real and eﬀective bids. We start by looking at the case in which β = λ
such that no player has a comparative advantage in warfare:
Proposition 4 Assume β = λ. In equilibrium it then holds for all r ∈ (0,1) that f1(r) >
f2(r) if λ < 1, f1(r) = f2(r) if λ = 1, and f1(r) < f2(r) if λ > 1; and that λf1(r) < f2(r) if
λ < 1
2, λf1(r) = f2(r) if λ ∈ [1
2,2], and λf1(r) > f2(r) if λ > 2.
15Proposition 4 states that the weaker player with lower βi and λi chooses higher real bids
fi(r) for any resource level r ∈ (0,1), just as in the quasi-equilibrium. As long as λ ∈ [1
2,2],
allocating more resources to warfare allows this player to compensate for his (or her) poorer
military technology λi and to end up with the same eﬀective bid λifi(r) for any r ∈ (0,1).
However if his technologies βi and λi are less than half as good as the opponent’s technologies,
i.e. if λ < 1
2 or λ > 2, then this weaker player ends up with the lower eﬀective bid for any
r ∈ (0,1). This result, which did not obtain in the quasi-equilibrium, is not due to the weaker
player not wanting to bid more to compensate for his poor military technology, but due to his
resource constraint. As Proposition 1 implies, this player bids all of his resources, but this is
not enough to reach the same eﬀective bid as the stronger opponent who generally bids half
her resources (but never more than necessary to win with probability one). From an ex ante
perspective the two players are thus equally likely to win the war unless their technologies
are suﬃciently dissimilar.
We next compare real and eﬀective bids for the more interesting case in which β < λ,
such that player 1 has a comparative advantage in warfare.
Proposition 5 Assume β < λ. In equilibrium it then holds that f1(r) > f2(r) for all r ∈
(0,1) if λ ≤ 1. Otherwise, f1(r) > f2(r) for r below or suﬃciently close to 2λcl, and f1(r) <
f2(r) for r suﬃciently close to 1. Further it holds for all r ∈ (0,1) that λf1(r) < f2(r) if
λ < 1
2, λf1(r) = f2(r) if λ = 1
2, and λf1(r) > f2(r) if λ > 1
2.
It follows from Proposition 5 that results relating to the players’ real bids are again similar
in equilibrium as in the quasi-equilibrium discussed in section 3. When player 1, who has a
comparative advantage in warfare, has an absolute disadvantage in warfare, then she allocates
at any resource level a higher share of her resource to warfare than her opponent. But when
having a comparative as well as an absolute advantage in warfare, she allocates more resources
to warfare than her opponent at low resource levels, but less at high resource levels.
Proposition 5 also states (and Figures 4 and 5 illustrate) that player 1 chooses the higher
eﬀective bid than her opponent for any resource level if her military technology is at least half
as good as her opponent’s. As argued earlier, player 1 has this incentive to build a stronger
military because of her comparative advantage in warfare. But for any resource level, player
161 ends up with the weaker military if her military technology is not even half as good as
her opponent’s. The reason for this result, which did not obtain in the quasi-equilibrium, is
not that player 1 does not want to choose a higher eﬀective bid, but again that her resource
constraint rules this out. She can only bid all her resources r1, which she does for any r1 if
λ < 1
2. She then ends up with the lower eﬀective bid than player 2, because his best response
is to generally bid half of his resources, and because his military technology is more than
twice as good. From an ex ante perspective, the player with a comparative advantage in
warfare consequently wins the war with higher probability than her opponent if and only if
her military technology is at least half as good as her opponent’s military technology. These
results are illustrated in Figure 2, where white regions indicate that player 1 is more likely to
win, and grey regions that player 2 is more likely to win.
Hirshleifer (1991) discusses the Paradox of Power, i.e. why weak players often win against
stronger opponents. Our model helps to understand in what circumstances the Paradox of
Power emerges. It suggests that the player with the poorer military technology is more likely
to win the war if and only if she has a comparative advantages in warfare and her military
technology is at least half as good as her opponent’s.
5 Conclusions
We have presented a model of war and conﬂict that oﬀers a diﬀerent perspective than standard
models of conﬂicts. In our model the outcome of the war is uncertain from the countries’
perspective because they lack information about their opponents’ resources, not because luck
plays any role on the battleﬁeld. We have characterized monotone continuous equilibrium
strategies and have shown how they depend on absolute and comparative advantages in
warfare. We have seen that if the country with a comparative advantage in warfare has a
large absolute disadvantage in warfare, then it allocates all resources to warfare, but is still
unlikely to win the war against its much stronger opponent that only allocates some fraction
of its resources to warfare. But if the country with a comparative advantage in warfare has
also an absolute advantage or only a modest absolute disadvantage in warfare, then it chooses
17the stronger military at any resource level and is therefore likely to win the war. It is the
country with a comparative advantage in warfare that allocates more resources to warfare
at low resource levels, while absolute advantages matter at high resource levels because no
country wants to divert many more resources away from production when already winning
the war with high probability.
It is noteworthy that the equilibrium strategies are similar in an alternative version of our
game in which the winner receives the resources that the loser allocated to production (rather
than the produced goods) and can then use these resources to produce consumption goods
with its own production technology. In this alternative version, production technologies play
no crucial role and the equilibrium strategies coincide with the equilibrium strategies in our
model when β = 1, implying that no country would ever allocate all resources to warfare
irrespective of its resource level. This simpler game could also represent contests in ﬁrms
or political parties. In a ﬁrm, two groups may invest resources to convince the CEO that
it is their product that should be developed and/or marketed, and the winning group can
then use all remaining resources to develop, produce and market this product. In a political
party, two politicians may collect campaign contributions in the primaries to become their
party’s candidate, and the winner can then exhaust the contribution potential of all donors
supporting this party in the main electoral race.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: It directly follows from the requirement fi(ri) ∈ [0,ri] that f1(0) =
f2(0) = 0. Together with the required monotonicity of fi(ri), this implies that f1(.) and
f2(.) must be non-decreasing. We prove λf1(1) = f2(1) by contradiction. Suppose λifi(1) >
λjfj(1). For ri = 1, player i is then better oﬀ by deviating and playing bi =
fj(1)λj
λi < fi(1),
as this increases the winner’s payoﬀ while i still wins with probability one. Hence it must
hold in any monotone equilibrium that λifi(1) = λjfj(1). ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: The system of the diﬀerential equations (2) and (4), which is deﬁned






, characterizes mutual best responses. The terms in the square
























































We rename the variable y = z




























= β + K0r
β
λ−1

















Note that r1 ∈ f−1
1 (A) in (18) and r2 ∈ f−1
2 (λA) in (19). Equations (5) and (6) are the
solution to (18) and (19). ￿
Proof of Corollary 1: Equations (5) and (6) satisfy f1(0) = f2(0) = 0 only if K1 = K2 = 0,
and then λf1(1) = f2(1) only if K0 = 1. Inserting K0 = 1 and K1 = K2 = 0 into (5) and (6)
gives (7) and (8). ￿
Proof of Lemma 3: Given player 1’s strategy characterized in the ﬁrst statement, player
2’s best response lower than λcl follows from inserting f1(r1) = r1 into condition (4), which
then reduces to f−1
2 (λy) = 2λy, implying f2(r2) = r2
2 .
19Given player 2’s strategy characterized in the second statement, it follows that
∂u1(y;r1)
∂y =
2λ[β1(r1 − 2y) + β2λy] for r1 ≤ cl, which is positive since y ≤ r1 and β ≤ λ. Hence it is
optimal for player 1 to bid all resources whenever r1 ≤ cl. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1: It follows from Lemma 3 that f1(r1) = r1 is player 1’s best
response. It follows from Lemma 3 that f2(r2) = r2
2 is player 2’s best response for r2 ∈ [0,2λ],
and from Lemma 1 and f1(1) = 1 that player 2 should bid f2(r2) ≤ λ for all r2. Hence player









l . Then substitute K0 into


























Then plug K0, K1 and K2 into (5) and (6) to obtain (10) and (11).
It follows from the deﬁnition of h(x) that h′(x) > 0, h′′(x) < 0 and h(1) = h′(1) = 1;






























1(r1) > 0, f′
1(cl) = 1, f′′
1(r1) < 0 and f′
2(r2) > 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: To avoid confusion, we denote the strategies described by (10)
and (11) by ˜ f1(r1) and ˜ f2(r2), respectively.





2λ < 1 and
β
λ−β > 0 since max{1
2,β} < λ. Hence 2λcl < 1. It follows from 2λcl < 1 and 1
2 < λ that
cl < 1.
Second, we prove that fi(ri) ≤ ri for all ri ∈ [0,1] and i ∈ {1,2}. It is straightforward
that f1(r1) = r1 ≤ r1 for all r1 ∈ [0,cl], and it holds that f1(r1) ≤ r1 for all r1 ∈ (cl,1]
since ˜ f′
1(cl) = 1 and ˜ f′′
1(r1) < 0 for r1 > cl. It is also straightforward that f2(r2) = r2
2 ≤ r2
for all r2 ∈ [0,2λcl]. Hence we only need to identify the region in the parameter space in
which ˜ f2(r2) ≤ r2 for all r2 ∈ (2λcl,1] when cl = (2λ)
λ






































(β + 2λ)(2β + λ)
. (22)
The ﬁrst derivative of the left-hand side of (22) is zero only when ω = 4
β
λ−β, and the second
derivative of the left-hand side evaluated at ω = 4
β
λ−β is strictly positive. Hence the left-
hand side of (22) must be U-shaped with respect to ω. Thus, since the resource constraint
is not violated at r2 = 2λcl, we only need to verify that it is not violated at the top, i.e., at
r2 = 1. We therefore substitute r2 = 1 and cl = (2λ)
λ
β−λ into ˜ f2(r2) ≤ r2 and rearrange to
get λ ≤ Λ(β,λ).
Third, we prove that each player’s equilibrium strategy is their global best response against
their opponent’s equilibrium strategy. We start with player 1. It directly follows from Lemma
3 that f1(r1) = r1 is player 1’s best response for r1 ≤ cl. (Note that a deviation to some
y > cl is not feasible in this case.) Now suppose r1 > cl. We know from section 2 and Lemma
4 that f1(r1) = ˜ f1(r1) is player 1’s best response above cl. Hence we only need to show that
player 1 has no incentive to bid some y ≤ cl. When bidding some y ≤ cl, the payoﬀ of player








dr2. The ﬁrst derivative is
∂u1(y;r1)
∂y
= [β1(r1 − y) + β2λy]2λ − β12λy =
2λ
β2
(β(r1 − y) + (λ − β)y), (23)
and it must be positive since β < λ and y ≤ cl < r1. Hence player 1 has an incentive to
increase his bid whenever y ∈ [0,cl] and r1 > cl.
We now turn to player 2. Given player 1’s equilibrium strategy, the payoﬀ of player 2







0 β2(r2 − y)dr1 for y ≤ min{λcl,r2}
β1





cl (r1 − ˜ f1(r1))dr1 + β2





0 (r2 − y)dr1 for λcl ≤ y ≤ r2.
(24)
Suppose r2 ≤ 2λcl. We know from Lemma 3 that player 2’s optimal bid less than min{λcl,r2}
is y = r2
2 . Hence we only need to show that player 1 has no incentive to bid some y ∈ [λcl,r2].
















+ β2(r2 − y)












By construction of ˜ f2(r2), this derivative is zero when r2 = ˜ f−1










∂y must be negative. Hence player 2 has an incentive to reduce his
bid whenever y ∈ [λcl,r2] and r2 ≤ 2λcl. Now suppose r2 > 2λcl. We know from section 2
and Lemma 4 that f2(r2) = ˜ f2(r2) is player 2’s best response above λcl. Hence we only need







(r2 − 2y), (26)
which must be positive since r2 ≥ 2λcl and y ≤ λcl. Hence player 2 has an incentive to
increase his bid whenever y ≤ λcl and r2 > 2λcl.





< λ ≤ Λ(β,λ) implies Λ(β,λ) > 2. It can be shown that
h(x)









∂λ > 0 and ∂x












∂β > 0 whenever λ ≥ β. Thus, in the set deﬁned by
λ ≤ Λ(β,λ), Λ(β,λ) is smallest at the boundary characterized by λ = Λ(β,λ). Now, we look
for the point at which the level curve λ = Λ(β,λ) intersects with λ = β. It can be shown







λ+1 since λ > 1
2 and λ ≥ β. At the intersection it
must hold that limλ→β+ Λ(β,λ) = 3λ






< λ ≤ Λ(β,λ) implies Λ(β,λ) > 2.
Proof of Proposition 3: We again denote the strategies described by (10) and (11) by
˜ f1(r1) and ˜ f2(r2), respectively.
First, we derive the thresholds cl and ch, and prove the uniqueness of cl, 2λcl < 1 and



















l . The second
equality gives the implicit deﬁnition of cl. To prove existence and uniqueness of cl, we rewrite








. Note that φ(·)
is not well-deﬁned when x = 0, and that φ : (0,1] → (0,2] is a continuous and increasing




λ−β < 1. Then it can be shown that φ(ε) < ε. Hence φ(·) has a ﬁxed point
x∗ ∈ (0,1) satisfying x∗ = φ(x∗) whenever condition (12) is violated. Moreover, this ﬁxed
point is unique since φ′(x∗) > 1 whenever x∗ = φ(x∗). Hence there exists a unique cl, and
it must hold that 2λcl < 1. It follows from 2λcl < 1 that 1 < (2λcl)
− λ
β and, consequently,




that cl < (2λcl)
λ
β and, consequently, c2 < 1.
Second, we prove that fi(ri) ≤ ri for all ri ∈ [0,1] and i ∈ {1,2}. It is straightforward
that f1(r1) = r1 ≤ r1 for all r1 ∈ [0,cl], and it holds that f1(r1) ≤ r1 for all r1 ∈ (cl,1]
since ˜ f′
1(cl) = 1, ˜ f′′
1(r1) < 0 for r1 ∈ (cl,ch] and ˜ f1(r1) = ˜ f1(ch) for r1 ∈ (ch,1]. It is also
straightforward that f2(r2) = r2
2 ≤ r2 for all r2 ∈ [0,2λcl]; and cl is chosen such that player
2’s resource constraint is binding when r2 = 1. It can be shown along the same lines as in
the proof of that player 2 also bids strictly less then his resources for r2 ∈ (2λcl,1).
Third, we prove that each player’s equilibrium strategy is their global best response against
their opponent’s equilibrium strategy. The corresponding part of the proof of Proposition 2
applies here as well, as the arguments do not assume a value for cl. Hence we only need to
show that player 1 has no incentive to deviate for r1 ∈ (ch,1]. Therefore, suppose r1 ∈ (ch,1]










β1(r1 − y) + β2
 
˜ f−1
2 (λy) − λy
   d ˜ f−1
2 (λy)
dy
− β1 ˜ f−1
2 (λy). (28)
By construction of ˜ f1(r1), this derivative is zero when r1 = ˜ f−1






∂y must be positive when r1 ≥ ch, implying that in this case player 1
can proﬁtably increase his bid y. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: Results for λ ∈ [1
2,2] directly follow from Corollary 1 and our
discussion thereafter. Results for λ < 1
2 directly follow from Proposition 1. Results for λ > 2
23also follow from Proposition 1 after renaming player 1 as player 2, and vice versa. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: We ﬁrst prove the last statement comparing eﬀective bids. It
directly follows from the equilibrium strategies described in Proposition 1 that λf1(r) < f2(r)
for all r ∈ (0,1) if λ < 1
2, and that λf1(r) = f2(r) for all r ∈ (0,1) if λ = 1
2. To prove that
λf1(r) > f2(r) for all r ∈ (0,1) if λ > 1
2, we ﬁrst consider the case in which 1
2 < λ ≤ Λ(β,λ).
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium strategies for this case. Consider a particular
  y ∈ A such that   y = λf1(r1) = f2(r2). We need to show that r2 > r1. For   y ≤ λcl, it follows
from f1(r1) = r1 for r1 ∈ [0,cl], f2(r2) = r2
2 for r2 ∈ [0,2λcl], and λ > 1
2 that r2 ≥ r1 must









2 , where the second equality follows from cl = (2λ)
λ
β−λ. Since β < λ
and ri ∈ (0,1) for i = 1,2, r1 = r
λ
β
2 implies r2 > r1. Hence λf1(r) > f2(r) for all r ∈ (0,1)
if 1
2 < λ ≤ Λ(β,λ). It remains to consider the case in which λ > Λ(β,λ). Proposition 3
characterizes the equilibrium strategies for this case. Using the same strategy as above, we
can prove that λf1(r) > f2(r) for all r ∈ (0,ch). Moreover, it directly follows from f1(r1) = 1
λ
for r1 ≥ ch and f2(r2) ≤ r2 that λf1(r) > f2(r) must also hold for all r ∈ [ch,1).
We next prove the two statements comparing real bids. For λ ≤ 1
2, it directly follows
from the equilibrium strategies described in Proposition 1 that f1(r) > f2(r) for all r ∈ (0,1].
We have shown above that λf1(r) > f2(r) for all r ∈ (0,1) if λ > 1
2. Hence it must hold




. For λ > 1, Propositions 2 and 3 imply
f1(r) > f2(r) for r ∈ (0,2λcl]. Further it follows from Lemma 1 that f1(1) < f2(1) if λ > 1.
Hence the continuity of f1(r1) and f2(r2) and the intermediate value theorem imply that there
must exists an odd number of thresholds ˆ r in the interval (2λcl,1) that satisfy f1(ˆ r) = f2(ˆ r).
It holds that f1(r) > f2(r) for all r below the lowest threshold and f1(r) < f2(r) for all r
above the highest threshold. ￿
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